The term "customary law" has existed for a long time and generally does not cause special questions and discussions, as it seems understandable and familiar. Analyzing the well-established theory of customary law, the author suggests a new look at this concept, revealing a number of theoretical and epistemological problems. It is shown that the most common definition of customary law is inherently contradictory, the unjustifiably broad application of the concept impairs its content, and that custom is neither the only nor even the main source of non-state law. The author substantiates the idea of community law. He argues that this term is more relevant than the more common term "customary law" for the notion of law in a traditional society that is not based on the state power's will, as well as for non-state legal orders existing in present-day societies in parallel with official law. The main structural and substantial differences between community law and that of the state are demonstrated.
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